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Abstract 
This paper investigates the firm and transaction characteristics of PIPE issuers. Whereas 
previous empirical studies have been focused on the U.S. market, this paper focuses on the 
characteristics of the European market and also examines the importance of PIPEs as a source 
of financing and the impact of the institutional settings in key European countries. My 
findings show that many PIPE issuers are poor performing companies with high R&D 
expenditures in need of financing to keep their investment levels. I also find that the PIPE 
may act as a supplement, and cater the needs of firms with difficulties to obtain financing in 
the public space, and that these firms significantly underperform the market in the long run. 
My results further indicate that the institutional settings in Europe may act as a barrier in the 
PIPE market as evident from the low issue fractions and small transactions.  
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 3 
1 Introduction	  	  
The history of Private Investments in Public Equity “PIPEs” stems from the early 1990s in the 
U.S., where small public firms, primarily in biotechnology, pharmaceutical and the 
technology industry in the lack of traditional ways of financing managed to raise capital from 
wealthy private investors and hedge funds (Gerhard, 2008). The common characteristics of 
these firms were that they were high-risk companies with illiquid stock, low prominence 
among institutional investors and with a difficulty to bear the high costs of raising equity in 
the public space. In 1995, PIPE transactions in the U.S. raised a total of 1,4bn USD over 112 
transactions, and five years later in 2000 the total capital raised reached 24,5bn USD over 
1130 transactions. As the subprime crisis emerged, the PIPE market once again started to 
flourish, reaching a record of 123,9bn USD raised trough PIPEs counting the number of 
transactions to 1154. (Placementtracker, 2013). Financial institutions in need of capital 
injections turned to the PIPE market in order to receive quick financing and sovereign funds 
were willing to contribute with the capital needed. Shortly thereafter the credit crunch made 
its way, and with the lack of financing and investment opportunities, private equity and 
institutional investors turned to the PIPE market which at that point had developed to include 
larger and more mature companies. (Gerhard, 2008). The PIPE market has since developed to 
become a genuine source of financing and a supplement when banks tighten their credit 
policies and the capital markets are reluctant to provide capital due to the performance or 
soundness of the issuing firms.  
 
From a research perspective, the coverage of the PIPE market is rather scarce. The two most 
influential papers in the field were published by Brophy, Quimet and Sialm in 2006, and 
Chaplinsky and Haushalter in 2009. Although the late publishing years they were 
distinguished as working papers in the early 2000’s. Brophy, Quimet and Sialm (2006) 
focused on the role of the investor and the returns thereof and showed that the riskiest and 
worst performing firms raise the smallest amount while offering the largest price discount, 
and as an investor of last resort they turn to hedge funds. Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2009) 
compared different contract terms and how they relate to firm characteristics. Their paper 
characterise that the poorest performing, high spending and most uncertain firms tend to use 
more contingent terms while the better poor performing firms have less stringent contract 
terms or even price discount terms only. The common feature for both of these papers as well 
as later distinguished papers studying the PIPE market is that they found the same 
characteristics of the firms using the PIPE market; small, young and poor performers, often in 
R&D and capex intense industries such as biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, technology or 
telecommunication firms. And that PIPEs tend to be the financing of last resort.  
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From a geographical perspective research covering PIPEs, the transaction and firm 
characteristics have focused on the U.S. market only. As the PIPE market has become 
established in the U.S., it has also began to spread outside of the U.S. borders, and from 
studying the transaction levels from the Capital IQ database it shows that PIPEs started 
making its way into Europe around 2005. Existing literature covering the European market is, 
to say the least, scarce and the very few reports and papers found were all on a legal context, 
written by law professionals rather than academics.  
 
As PIPEs have begun to attain the statue of a genuine financing form and an international 
spread, the purpose of this paper was to study the importance of the PIPE market in Europe 
and to understand which companies are using PIPE transactions. The results are a 
contribution to existing literature on PIPEs and can be used to gain more knowledge about the 
characteristics of PIPE issuers and the importance of PIPEs as a source of financing. In order 
to understand what type of firms that issue PIPEs, the research approach of this paper was to 
study the firm characteristics of the issuers based on accounting data and stock price data. The 
PIPE data have then been compared to data of firms issuing secondary offerings, SEOs, in 
order to find any distinct characteristics. Moreover, the post-issue stock return of PIPE issuers 
has been examined to see how the firms perform after they have obtained financing. In 
addition, to understand the European PIPE market, transaction characteristics and the 
regulatory framework in key European jurisdictions was explored.  
 
Due to the relative unfamiliarity of PIPEs and their complex transactional structure, the scope 
of this paper was to study the developed European markets. A limitation was set to include 
countries where a minimum of 10 PIPE transactions has been conducted. The research period 
of choice extends over the time period of 1998 to 2011. Given that the PIPEs started to 
emerge in the 1990’s in the US and then later started to make their way to Europe, starting the 
coverage from 1998 means that practically the full life cycle of European PIPE transactions 
are included. The end year was set to 2011 to allow for post-issue return measurements. 
Additional benefits of the time period include coverage of two economic crises and booms, 
and as such depicts the characteristics of the PIPE market during a full business cycles and 
allows for a “before and after comparison” since the surge of transactions following the 
subprime crisis. Further, as a measure of safety the nations falling below the delimiting 
threshold and time period were examined to ensure no excessive loss of data.   
 
This paper is structured as following; section 2 will provide an institutional background on 
the PIPE market including the issue process, security structures and contract terms. Section 3 
describes the theoretical framework based on existing literature, and research questions 
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related to issuer characteristics, importance of the PIPE market, the post-issue stock 
performance and the institutional settings in key European nations. Section 4 presents the 
research methodology and the statistical and econometric models used. Section 5 presents the 
data selection process and descriptive statistics. Section 6 presents the empirical results and 
analysis based on the research questions formulated in section 3. Section 7 concludes the 
main findings and presents suggestions for future research. 
 
 
2 Background	  on	  PIPEs	  
The following section will provide information about PIPE transactions, the common 
structures of a PIPE and some of the key contract terms that may be found in a PIPE 
contract.  
2.1 What	  is	  a	  PIPE	  transaction?	  
A PIPE transaction is a form of equity-linked financing in which a public company will do a 
private equity offering of new issue shares, common stock held by selling stockholders or 
convertibles to a select number of accredited investors (Gormley, 2006). The PIPE 
transaction, in relation to a traditional private placement, does not depend on a review process 
for the closing to be effective; instead the PIPE issuer registers the shares for resale into the 
public market by the select investors. Generally, the shares cannot be traded immediately so 
the investors need to hold the shares until the resale registration or lock-up period has been 
effectuated. (Sjostrom, 2007). Furthermore, compared to a public offering which is subject to 
time-consuming book building, investment memorandum, road shows and investment 
banking fees, the PIPE transaction is a time and cost efficient way for the issuer to receive 
funding (Urquhart, 2006). In addition to raising capital in a time and cost efficient manner the 
advantages for the issuing party also includes confidentiality as the documentation is not as 
comprehensive, but also the opportunity to find a strategic partner that can bring in industrial 
expertise and support (Gerhard, 2008). Besides, attracting sophisticated investors could also 
have a signalling effect about the quality of the firm. From an investors point of view the 
advantages of PIPEs may include the price discount, thus an opportunity for good returns, but 
primarily PIPEs offer a liquid investment compared a regular private placement. A private 
placement can usually have a lock-up period of a year while the PIPE shares usually can be 
traded within a few months. (Steinberg and Obi, 2008). For both parties, the tailor-made 
structure offers both security and provides a transaction that is negotiated to suit for both 
parties (Gerhard, 2008).  
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2.2 PIPE	  Securities	  
A PIPE security can be structured in a wide variety of ways although some structures are 
more used than other. Some of the most widely used ones are:  Common Stock PIPE and 
Fixed Convertible PIPE. The decision on PIPE structure depends on the preferences from the 
issuing company and the negotiation with investors. Generally they can be categorized into 
two groups: Traditional PIPEs and Structured PIPEs. (Dai, 2009). In the following section 
some of the possible PIPE structures are presented.  
 
2.2.1 Traditional	  PIPEs	  
Common characteristics for Traditional PIPEs are that they are not price protected; a fixed 
price is typically set at a discount to the moving market average. (PlacementTracker, 2013). 
Some of the common Traditional PIPEs are briefly explained below.  
 
Common Stock 
The common stock PIPE is the most basic type of PIPE structure and also the most commonly 
used one (Dai, 2009). It is a common stock offering where the price and number of shares are 
predetermined. Based on the contractual terms additional features such as warrants may be 
included in a common stock PIPE.  
 
Common Stock Shelf Sale 
A common stock shelf sale PIPE is similar to the basic common stock PIPE but the shares 
have been pre-registered and permit the issuer to offer their shares when they want to but 
when filed there is no intention do immediately sell all or any of the securities.  I.e. taking the 
shares of the shelf when they need to.  
 
Convertible Fixed Offering 
The convertible fixed offering PIPE is a form of security that allows the holder to convert 
their security into a different security, typically common stock. The fixed part means that the 
security converts into common stock at a predetermined fixed price. If the convertible price is 
above market price the investor will not convert to common share, but the convertible security 
in itself has an on-going payoff in form of a dividend. 
 
2.2.2 Structured	  PIPEs	  
Unlike Traditional PIPEs, the Structured PIPEs share the characteristics of being price 
protected. The price protection have an effect that the conversion price depends on the future 
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market price of the stock and as such may be revised downwards if the market price of the 
share falls which has the effect of a greater dilution of shares. (PlacementTracker, 2013). 
Some of the common Structured PIPEs are briefly explained below. 
 
Common Stock Reset 
A common stock PIPE combined with a resettable warrant. The reset term means that at a 
future point in time, if the market price of the stock declines then the stock price may be reset 
in favour of the investor.  
 
Convertible Variable or Floating Rate Convertible 
The convertible variable PIPE are different from the fixed offering convertible mentioned 
above as it has a variable conversion price that depends on the market price of the underlying 
common stock. As such it is price protected so if the market price of the common stock falls 
the conversion price will also decrease. This is a feature that may create a dilution for the 
issuer as the PIPE deal generally is based on an investment amount, so a lower share price 
leads to a greater proportion of shares to the investor.  
 
Convertible Reset 
A variant of the convertible variable but with less price sensitivity is the convertible reset. 
Like the convertible variable it is price protected but instead of a variable price there is a reset 
date at which the conversion price could change. This may have the same diluting effect as 
the variable, if the share price goes down until the reset date, the conversion price will be at a 
lower than the initial level. 
 
Structured Equity Line Offering 
The structured Equity Line PIPE is similar to a common stock PIPE in a sense that the 
investors commits an amount to buy the company’s common stock within a time period. 
Unlike the common stock PIPE, there may be several instalments in a structured equity line 
PIPE. As the stock is issued over time this may benefit the investor if the stock price declines 
but it may also go the other way around, so the structured equity line PIPE offers a downside 
protection for the investor.  
 
For some of the Structured PIPEs there is a potential issue for the issuing firm: as the 
convertibles have variable and reset features this may cause the investors to short sell or try to 
push the market price down in order to take advantage of their position to make profit or gain 
control of the issuing company. Certain types of short selling, such that occur before the 
registration has been effective, may violate regulations while other short-selling in a hedging 
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perspective of their investment may be in line with regulations. (Dai, 2009). To avoid what is 
referred to as “toxic converts” or “death spirals”, floors on conversion price or caps on 
number of shares issued can be included to the contracts to avoid attempts to manipulate the 
stock price downwards (Sjostrom, 2007).  
 
2.3 Contracting	  Terms	  
The contractual structure of PIPEs can be quite unique as the contract terms often are 
negotiated between the issuer and the investor (Bengtsson and Dai, 2011). This section 
describes some of the key contract terms between the PIPE issuer and investor. 
 
Anti-dilution protection 
Anti-dilution protection is commonly used downside protection in PIPE offerings to protect 
the investor from future financing offerings at a lower level than the current one.  It may be 
that the terms are set so future financing are set to equal the current offering and as such 
protects the investor from a price decrease. In a stricter form it can put a restriction on the 
issuing firm not allowing them to issue any equity during a certain period after the share 
registration has been declared effective.   
 
Investor Registration Rights 
The investor registration rights are in place to mitigate the investor’s risk by enforcing the 
issuing company to file the share registration within a short time period after the PIPE 
transaction. This follows as the key characteristics of the PIPE is its time-efficiency of 
financing, and as the shares are illiquid for a time until the share registration has been 
effectuated this contract term mitigate the investors illiquidity risk.  
 
Redemption Rights 
Redemption rights provide the investor with the optionality to force redemption of its PIPE 
investment under certain circumstances, e.g. upon a change of control. Besides the face value 
of the claim it may also include accrued interest.  
 
Investor Right of First Refusal and Investor Call Options 
These provisions, like the anti-dilution protection, are downside protections and give the 
investors the right to buy additional shares in the company for a certain time period. Hence, 
this term is quite similar to the warrant structured PIPEs. 
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Company Put Option 
The company put option is a protection for the issuer, unlike the Investor Call Option that is 
an investor protection, and gives the company the right to request that the investor buys 
additional shares.  
 
Company-Forced Conversion 
This provision dictates that if the performance of the firm reach desired levels, e.g. measured 
as stock performance, the investors need to give up their contractual protections and convert 
their shares to common stock. As such it is like the company put option a contract term for the 
issuer’s rights.  
 
Lock-up Period 
Similar to the provision when a company goes public, a lock-up period means that the 
investors must remain owners and cannot sell their shares for a certain period of time.  
 
Short-selling 
Short-selling provision prohibits the investor to hedge their investment or take a short position 
in the company. 
 
3 Theoretical	  and	  empirical	  framework	  	  
This section presents the literature of relevance for the key research questions in this paper: 
characteristics of the companies that issue PIPEs, the relevance of the PIPE market as a 
financing form, the post-issue stock performance of PIPE issuers, and the institutional 
settings.  
3.1 Characteristics	  of	  PIPE	  issuers	  
Companies using the PIPE market are often characterised by their distressed nature. They 
tend to be young and small firms with poor performance and high risk where high information 
asymmetry is present, which has been shown in previous research, see for example Brophy, 
Quimet and Sialm (2006), Dai (2007), Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2009), Bengtsson and Dai 
(2011). The existing literature related to the firm specifics of PIPE issuers have focused on 
the offering in relation to the investor, the contract terms and the choice of private versus 
public offerings. In a distinguished paper by Brophy, Quimet and Sialm (2006) the authors 
outline the role of investors, primarily with a focus on hedge funds, as a source of funding for 
public companies issuing equity capital. They found that firms that obtain equity funding 
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from hedge funds tend to be smaller and with weaker fundamentals compared to firms that 
obtain equity funding from other investors. They also show that these high-risk firms tend to 
obtain significantly smaller investments. Further, they show that the firms making PIPE 
offerings have poor operating performance but despite their poor performance they make high 
R&D investments and capital expenditures. Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2009) outline the 
distinction of the companies turning to the PIPE market compared to other more established 
markets, and along with the findings of Brophy, Quimet and Sialm (2006) they show that 
PIPE issuers are of in bad shape. The vast majority of firms issuing PIPEs have negative 
operating performance and more than half have declining stock prices in the year prior to the 
PIPE issue. Moreover, they have high intangible assets and high levels of R&D expenditure. 
Aligned with these characteristics they found that many of the issuing companies are active 
within biotechnology, pharmaceuticals or the technology industry.  In a sense, the companies 
need the external funding to keep their investment levels and to avoid even worse financial 
distress but with poor performance and severe information asymmetry they face difficulties 
getting funding from public offerings or the debt capital markets, and leaving the PIPE market 
as a last resort for financing. In some contrast, Ellis and Twite (2012) indicate that PIPE 
issuers are not distressed firms but rather firms that are in the beginning of their growth face, 
where they due to low cash holding a high level of R&D expenditure need capital for 
investment in growth opportunities. In addition, they found that the issuers in their sample, 
consisting solely of companies in R&D intensive industries, have a positive stock return in the 
year prior to the issue. Gomes and Philips (2005) contribute with what they call the pecking 
order of security issuance where their findings include a reverse pecking order in the private 
issuance space, i.e. as information asymmetry increase firms become more likely to issue 
equity. Although they do not examine the traditional pecking order of Myers and Majluf 
(1984), their results indicate that the traditional pecking order measure need to take into 
account the market in which a security is issued. Secondly, they found that companies are 
more likely to issue equity in the private space when the share price has fallen, as opposed to 
issuing public equity. The latter is also consistent with the findings of Chen, Dai and 
Schatzberg (2009), which suggest that the PIPE market is a supplement to public offerings 
and that companies approach private investors when market conditions are bad. They refer to 
this as the undervaluation hypothesis that SEO offerings are issued in time of good market 
performance and when they perceive their stock to be undervalued they turn to the private 
market. Similar to Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2006) and Brophy, Quimet and Sialm (2009), 
Chen, Dai and Schatzberg also found that companies turning to the PIPE market have weak 
fundamentals and experience poor operating performance.  
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To examine the characteristics of European companies turning to the PIPE market the 
following research questions have been formulated: 
• How does operating performance relate to the choice of issuing a PIPE? 
• Are PIPE transactions driven by stock underpricing? 
• Does financial distress affect the choice of PIPE or SEO? 
• How does expenditure and asset characteristics relate to PIPE issuance? 
• Is the size of a company related to the choice of a PIPE transaction? 
 
3.2 Post-­‐issue	  stock	  performance	  
When a public offering is made on the market the share price generally declines. To the 
contrary, following a private placement announcement the stock-price has a positive reaction 
in the short-term. The initial positive reaction can be interpreted on a behavioural level where 
investors are overoptimistic about the future prospects of the issuing firm even if recent 
performance has been poor. Investors anticipate a change and better performance going 
forward but most commonly the long-term post-issue performance of the companies tends to 
be poor. (Hertzel et al., 2002). This is consistent with the findings of Ellis and Twite (2012), 
which suggest that PIPEs are a bet on growth option given their high R&D intensity and 
uncertain nature. Wruck (1989) discuss the positive effect in terms of concentration of 
ownership. As a private placement is offered to a limited number of investors while a public 
offering is aimed to the masses, the author indicate that a concentrated ownership can better 
align interest and efficiency than dispersed ownership.  This could be a driving factor for the 
short-term performance while the perhaps unimplemented efficiencies come through in the 
long run resulting in falling stock prices. The post-issuance short and long-term returns for 
PIPEs have been studied in several papers e.g. Brophy, Quimet and Sialm (2006), Dai (2007), 
Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2009), with consistent findings indicating a positive short-term 
return and poor long run performance. Brophy, Quimet and Sialm (2006) take an interesting 
approach by looking at the performance by the type of investor, more specifically hedge fund 
versus other investors. Their findings indicate that companies issuing PIPEs to hedge funds 
experience no positive post-issue return surrounding the announcement while the companies 
issuing to other investors experience a significantly positive return around the announcement 
of a PIPE. In the long run they show that both investor groups underperform their benchmark, 
but that there is greater underperformance among the companies raising capital from hedge 
funds. In a similar way Dai (2007) studies the importance of investor by examining the 
performance of PIPE issuers with venture capital firms versus hedge funds as investors. 
Consistent with Brophy, Quimet and Sialm (2006) the findings of Dai (2007) point to the fact 
that there is neither a short-term or long-term positive return related to hedge funds as 
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investors. For firms that raise capital from Venture Capitalists there is both a positive short-
term effect and a positive long-term performance as measured by the one-year return. The 
findings imply that having a venture capital firm as an investor may act as a certification of 
commitment and performance.  
 
As a measure to see how PIPE issuers progress after the issuance, the stock performance and 
the meaning of investor type have been considered according to the following: 
• Does the ex-post stock performance of PIPE issuers relate to investor type? 
• How does the stock price evolve in the short-term and long-term after the issuance? 
 
3.3 Importance	  of	  the	  PIPE	  market	  
The emergence of the PIPE market has become a financing supplement for the small and 
weaker firms that are in a difficult position to accessing capital via public offerings or the 
debt markets.  Not only may the cost of issuing in the public space be too expensive but they 
may also have a hard time attracting institutional investors as the information coverage for 
these firms tend to be scarce. The rise of the PIPE market has been an important development 
for this type of firms as it has improved not only the access to capital but also the 
environment for these firms with greater liquidity and coverage post issuance. (Dai, Jo, and 
Schatzberg, 2008). Even if the PIPE market has appealed to the small and midsize companies, 
the attraction for this asset class has grown and led to participation of a greater variety of 
companies including larger established companies (Gormley 2006). In addition, Ellis and 
Twite (2012) found that during the period 1991 to 2007 there was twice as many PIPE 
transactions made compared to SEOs, but the transaction value was only about 15 percent of 
the amount raised in the average SEO. However, recent data from Placementtracker (2013) 
show that deal volume has went done over the last years while the amount raised is on an 
increasing trend, giving further support to the findings of Gormley (2006). Hodge provide 
insight on the matter by suggesting that when companies need to revise their balance sheet, 
repay maturing debt or raise equity to meet capital requirements, the PIPE market may offer 
several advantages to do so, regardless of firm size (Hodge 2010). Furthermore, as most 
issuers will return to the capital markets for financing they need to be strategic in their 
approach, the old way of thinking of just getting the money is no longer the way to go. By 
bringing an attractive option to the table in form of a discounted PIPE security the issuer can 
attract the price sensitive Private Equity investors and get access to long-term investors with 
aligned interest in growing the firm and appreciating the stock price, and be better positioned 
for future financings. (Goldfarb and Carlson, 2006). The PIPE market has also seen a shift on 
the investor side from the initial set-up mostly consisting of hedge funds to attracting venture 
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capital and private equity investors. When many of the traditional financing options are too 
expensive or are unavailable the Private Equity firms look for alternatives and have began to 
turn their heads and eye investment opportunities in the PIPE market with reduced equity 
value. Equally, for Venture Capital firms the interest has grown as the PIPE market opens up 
opportunities for negotiating similar terms as with start-up but with established firms (Hodge 
2010). On a side note, Dai (2009) also highlight the importance of the PIPE market for the 
Investment Banks as the traditional activities such as IPO, SEO and M&A have seen 
travelling a rough path, an increased activity among the banks in the PIPE market may bolster 
their revenues while also contributing to more competition, expertise, and efficiency in the 
market.  
 
To better understand the relative importance of PIPE transactions as either a supplement or 
substitute to the SEO market this paper will, in addition to the firm characteristics, assess the 
following:  
• Is the size of the transaction a leading factor for the choice of issuing a PIPE? 
• How does the extent of PIPE transactions relate to SEOs, and has it evolved? 
 
3.4 Institutional	  settings	  in	  Europe	  
The coverage of regulations has been limited to France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and 
United Kingdom1. The laws are defined by abbreviations2.  
 
PIPE transactions have not reached the same level of attraction in the European market as in 
the US not only because of unfamiliarity but in large part because of the legal and regulatory 
hinders that exist in many of the European jurisdictions. For example, Jones, Hurlock, and 
Henry (2003) states that in a historical perspective European public companies and 
institutional investors have not acknowledged PIPE transactions as a viable option for 
financing due to the following reasons:  -­‐ Because of the legal and or regulatory hinders PIPE transactions have generally been 
considered difficult to structure and execute 
                                                
1 These are the countries in which majority of the PIPE transactions take place. Although 
Norway qualifies, the regulatory framework in the Nordic countries area like, thus 
representable by Sweden  
 
2 Germany: Aktiengesetz (AG), France: Code de Commerce (CC), Sweden: Aktiebolagslagen 
(ABL), Switzerland: Code of Obligations (CO), United Kingdom: Companies Act (CA) 
 14 
-­‐ The European market is relatively undeveloped when it comes to issuers and 
investors ability to structure transactions in order to overcome legal and or regulatory 
barriers -­‐ PIPEs as a form of financing has been conceived to be an unviable financing option 
because of the negative results from previous issuers, even though the failing issuers 
were not apt for the funding 
 
The European framework covering new issue of shares, private offerings and pre-emptive 
rights lies within The Second Company Law Directive (EEC). The directive is a capital 
directive set forth to harmonize the corporate law in the European Union. It is a minimum 
directive enabling each member state to have more stringent regulations. In 77/91/EEC 
Article 25, chapter 1, it is stated that any increase in capital must be decided upon by the 
general shareholders’ meeting. Moreover, Article 29 states that any increase of capital and the 
new shares are paid in cash, the shares should be offered on a pre-emptive basis to 
shareholders according to the proportion of shares that they hold.  
 
Given the complex and prevalent nature of regulations the following sections include a 
condensed description of what is considered the key elements in relation to a PIPE issuance 
with a purpose to illustrate similarities and differences for the selected countries. 
 
3.4.1 Issue	  Process	  
France 
To issue new shares in France the management needs authorization to proceed. This 
authorization cannot be completed during an ordinary general meeting; rather a specific 
general meeting must be called upon to carry out such a transaction. (CC L225-129). In 
addition, the notification on such meeting must be given at least 35 days before the meeting 
(CC R225-73). The shareholders authorization may delegate authority to the directors to 
determine the terms, amount to be issued and when to issue. (CC L225-129). The new issue 
decision as well as authorization vote needs a majority of two thirds (CC L225-96).  
 
Germany 
As for all the members states of the European Union, Germany is in large bound to the 
directives and regulations as the basis for national legislation. Measures to increase the capital 
under German law requires that a majority of shareholders, no less than three fourths of the 
share capital represented at the shareholders’ meeting (AG §182). German law also allows 
that the shareholders may authorise the management to issue new equity capital. The 
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authorisation is viable for 5 years and can be extended each year. The aggregate amount the 
authorisation may include cannot exceed 50 percent of the outstanding share capital, and 
similarly to an ordinary issue the general shareholders meeting must approve with at least 
three quarters majority. During an authorised issue to specified investors the company 
management and board of directors must approve the transaction and its terms by a simple 
majority, and notify the shareholders about the terms during the next annual meeting. (AG 
§202-204). 
 
Sweden 
In order to issue new capital in Sweden the decision may not contradict the company’s 
articles regarding size of share capital. In order to progress under such circumstances the 
companies articles must first be amended. If the issue does not interfere with the company’s 
articles the new issue decision can be made by the board of directors or proposed during the 
general shareholders meeting (ABL 11 kap §2, 13kap §3). Terms on the issue must also be 
proposed including share type, price, amount and time for issue. (ABL 13kap §4-5). 
 
Switzerland 
Similar to the European Union countries, a new capital issue in Switzerland can be made 
either through an ordinary capital increase or authorized capital increase. In an ordinary 
capital increase the general shareholders meeting pass the resolution, and the issue must be 
carried out within three months. The resolution includes the amount to be issued, share type, 
and pricing. (CO div 3, sec 1, art. 650). To authorize a capital increase the company’s articles 
must be changed and the authorization is viable for up to two years. The authorized capital 
may not exceed half of the share capital at the time of authorization. (CO div 3, sec 1, art. 
651).  
 
United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom the directors does not convey the power to issue new shares, 
externally, of the company according to the general rule (CA §549). The exception holds if 
the directors are authorized to do so for a specific exercise or if they have a general 
authorization. In case of an authorization it is feasible within certain conditions, such as 
maximum amount of shares that can be issued. The authorization may be viable for a 
maximum of five years, and can both be renewed and revoked by the general meeting. (CA 
§551). Hence, the legislation in the United Kingdom follows The Second Company Directive.  
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3.4.2 Pre-­‐emptive	  Rights	  
The statutory pre-emptive rights means that unless existing shareholders waive their pre-
emptive rights, new shares cannot be issued unless the existing shareholders are offered first. 
It also includes that all shareholders must be treated equally, regardless of ordinary of 
preferred shares. Although there is some differences in each of the countries Company law’s 
the pre-emptive right regulation looks relatively similar.  
 
In order to overcome and exclude the statutory pre-emptive rights the process is not as 
universal as the right itself, although similarities prevail. In general the disapplication of the 
pre-emptive rights require shareholder approval and in some countries it is possible to 
authorise the management to issue new share and exclude the subscription rights. The general 
principles on authorisation is discussed, as previously mentioned, in 77/91/EEC Art. 25 ch.2 
where it is stated that the general shareholders’ meeting may authorize to increase the 
subscribed capital to a maximum amount set in accordance to potential laws regarding such 
amount. The authorisation is viable for a maximum of 5 years and can be extended by the 
general shareholders’ meeting for a maximum of 5 years at a time. 
 
France 
During a new issue with non-pre-emptive rights, exceeding 10 percent of the outstanding 
share capital, the PIPE price need to be determined in unification with the Financial Markets 
Authority and report must be provided to the shareholders describing info on capital increase, 
reasons for it, reasons for excluding the pre-emptive rights (Conseil d’etat Decret no.67).	  However,	   if the amount to be issued does not exceed 10 percent of the share capital, the 
management may determine the price (CC L225-136). When authorised to issue to unspecific 
shareholders, the price cannot be below the 10-day average share price, and the authorisation 
can be valid for a maximum of 24 months. If issue is to an identified investor or group of 
investors, the average price rule is however not a requirement (CC L225-138). 
 
Germany 
In Germany it is permitted for the subscription rights to be disapplied if the capital increase 
does not exceed 10 percent of the share capital. It is also stated that the new issue price cannot 
be substantially below the current market price, however a certain discount is allowed, there 
is no specified limit on the threshold. In addition, the issue need to be approved by the general 
shareholders meeting with three quarters of the represented capital. For issues larger than 10 
percent of the outstanding share capital, where the pre-emptive rights are to be excluded the 
management board need to provide justification for its acting. (AG §186).  
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Sweden 
To purse a PIPE issue in Sweden the shareholders must waive their pre-emptive rights during 
the general shareholders meeting by a majority of two thirds of the voting rights and capital 
share being present (ABL 13 kap §2). The proposition to disapply the pre-emptive rights must 
be included in the notification for the shareholders meeting. Further, it needs to be justified 
why the rights are to be exempt and also the general terms of the issue should be explained. 
(ABL 13kap §10). Moreover, it is possible for the board of directors to make a decision on 
new issue before a general shareholders meeting approval. During such circumstances the 
same information as above needs to be presented to the shareholders for the meeting, and if 
the shareholders does not approve the issue it will be cancelled. As such, the new shares will 
not be added to the share capital until approved. (ABL 13 kap §31-34).  
 
Switzerland 
As for the European Union states each shareholder is entitled to their proportion of newly 
issued shares that corresponds to the amount that they currently hold. (CO div 3, sec 1, art. 
652b). To withdraw the pre-emptive rights a qualified majority of two thirds of the voting 
rights represented at the general shareholders meeting (CO div 3, sec 2, art. 704). In order to 
disapply this right a good cause must justify, examples of good causes include investment or 
takeover of companies. However, the cancellation of the pre-emptive right cannot result in 
any improper disadvantages for the shareholders. Reasons for the disapplication must be 
provided (CO div 3, sec 1, art. 652b). 
 
United Kingdom 
In order to overcome the pre-emptive rights the board of directors must recommend the 
decision to its shareholders in form of a written letter recommending the disapplication of 
pre-emptive rights. A justification for making the recommendation must also be made and the 
amount to be issued along with a justification of the amount. (CA §571). Further, in the UK 
there are guidelines issued by the Investor Protection Committee, IPC, which, among other 
things, address the shareholder approval process. These guidelines make it easier for a firm to 
issue new capital if the new amount is less than 10 percent of outstanding capital. If the issue 
exceeds the 10 percent threshold and at the same time calls for disapplication of the pre-
emptive rights, it becomes more difficult for the firm to receive shareholder approval. In 
general, the more the issue deviates from the guidelines the more difficult the process 
become. (Jones, Hurlock, and Henry, 2003).  
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3.4.3 Mandatory	  Takeover	  Rules	  	  
Mandatory Takeover Rules state that when an investor reaches a certain amount of 
ownership, measured as share capital or voting rights depending on jurisdiction, the investor 
is required to make public the size of the holdings as well as make a general offer to all 
shareholders. All of the countries considered have a relatively high ownership threshold. In 
France the mandatory bid threshold is at one third of the capital or voting rights. In Germany, 
Sweden and United Kingdom it is 30 percent of the voting rights, and in Switzerland it is one 
third of the voting rights. (Finansinspektionen 2013; Gerhard 2008; Practical Law 2007). 
Given the high threshold it is fairly unlikely that a PIPE transaction will trigger the rule. 
 
3.4.4 Differences	  compared	  to	  the	  United	  States	  
Directors in the United States compared to their European counterparties have greater 
freedom to increase the share capital. They have the capability to issue new shares without the 
need to be delegated, and they can issue shares to an amount greater than the outstanding 
shares capital. The biggest difference between Europe and the United States lies within the 
pre-emptive rights. In the United States there is no corporate law covering each of the states. 
The two main frameworks include the Model Business Corporate Act and Delaware Law, 
where most of the listed companies in the United States are registered, and none of these two 
laws provide for pre-emptive rights. However, both law states that it is possible for a 
company to include pre-emptive rights in the company articles (Ventoruzzo, 2013). In 
addition to the corporates laws the stock exchanges have rules that limit management 
discretion and that restrict companies which shares are listed on the stock exchange. As an 
example both NYSE and NASDAQ have the 20 percent rule which entails that shareholder 
approval is necessary for an issuance of 20 percent of the common stock or voting powers, 
including the aggregate of several issues to account for the 20 percent rule. (Skadden, 2012). 
Similarly, under United States securities laws there is no mandatory takeover rule. If a bidder 
purchases a large controlling block of shares it does not automatically require the bidder to 
make an offer for the remaining shares of the company. (Reemers, 2005). 
 
To understand how the institutional settings in Europe impact the PIPE market the following 
question will be considered: 
• Is there a pattern between the regulatory framework and the fraction issued in PIPE 
transactions? 
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4 Method	  
The following section outlines the research methodology, the data selection process and the 
economic models applied. 
4.1 Method	  description	  
The research approach of this paper stems from existing literature covering the deal and firm 
characteristics, and the stock price performance of the issuers. Existing literature found 
significant parallels between PIPE issuance and; poor operating performance, high 
expenditures, firm size (Chaplinsky and Haushalter, 2009), distressed nature of firm (Brophy, 
Quimet and Sialm, 2006), declining stock price prior to issue (Gomes and Philips, 2005). In 
addition, related to the post-issue performance e.g. Hertzel et al. (2002), and Dai (2007) found 
a positive short-term return and negative long-term return, and that the investor may affect the 
stock performance. Furher, Ellis and Twite (2012), and Gormley (2006) portray the 
importance of PIPEs and how it appeals to all type of firms. As all the previous research is 
conducted on the U.S. market there is an interesting opportunity to explore how it compares 
to Europe. The geographical shift includes an additional layer of qualitative character 
consisting of the institutional settings in Europe. In order to examine the regulations relevant 
for PIPE transactions, the European Commission framework and a selection of countries 
corporate law have been studied. In each of them, the sections covering increase of share 
capital have been examined. Performance, firm, and transaction characteristics are examined 
by using accounting and stock price data.  The data is quantified using statistical methods and 
regression analysis. The tests are formulated and based on the existing literature mentioned 
earlier in this section.   
 
To examine the determinants of PIPE issuance and stock performance regression analyses are 
performed using the EViews software. The test method of choice for examining factors 
affecting the choice of a PIPE issuance is a regression analysis based on the probit model, 
which is applicable when the dependent variable is of binary form. The probit model, along 
with the other models applied, is explained later in this paper. The dependent variable is of 
qualitative nature and defines if the transaction is a PIPE or SEO while the independent 
variables are indicator variables for company and deal characteristics, defined in Appendix A. 
The indicator variables have been chosen to cover the areas of transaction characteristics, 
operating performance, past stock performance, firm size, financial distress, and expenditure 
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and asset profile, where the specific variables have been decided upon based on the previous 
research and their findings. The variables for the PIPE issuers will be tested against the same 
data for SEO issuers as a measure of distinction of companies issuing PIPEs. Benchmarking 
against SEOs have been done in previous research; see for example Chen, Dai and Schatzberg 
(2009) and Ellis and Twite (2012). Furthermore, it can be argued that SEOs are a suitable 
comparable since a firm can raise additional equity capital either in the private space or in the 
public space through a SEO.  
 
To study the stock performance of PIPE issuers this paper follows the method applied by 
Brophy, Quimet and Sialm (2006). First, the long-term, one-year, buy-and-hold return is 
transformed in to excess return by deducting the risk free rate. The abnormal returns are then 
computed using a selection of models. The first model computes the abnormal return relative 
to the market. The second model is the Fama-French Three Factor model, which includes the 
market return, market cap and book-to-market factors. To see if the abnormal returns are 
statistically different from zero a Wilcoxon signed-rank test and Student’s t-test have been 
performed. Both tests have been applied in order to consider the mean and the median values. 
In addition, the short-term stock performance has been studied using the 7-day buy-and-hold 
return and applying the test models. To test for the difference in returns between investor 
classes a version of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test known as the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 
test has been applied. 
 
4.2 Statistical	  and	  Econometric	  models	  
4.2.1 The	  Probit	  Model	  
The probit model is a regression model used when the dependent variable is of binary form, 
which means that the variable can only take two values, i.e. 1 or 0.   
The probit model equation is defined as: 
 𝑃 𝑦 = 1 𝑥 =   𝐺(𝛽! +   𝛽!𝑥! +⋯+   𝛽!𝑥!) 
 
In the probit model, G is the standard normal cumulative distribution function taking on 
values strictly between 0 and 1. This certifies that the response probabilities are strictly 
between 0 and 1. The response probability is defined as 𝑃 𝑦 = 1 𝑥 , and can be further 
explained as a probability for y to take on the value of 1 based on: 
 𝑦 = 1, 𝑖𝑓  𝑦  𝑖𝑠  𝑎  𝑃𝐼𝑃𝐸  𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛0, 𝑖𝑓  𝑦  𝑖𝑠  𝑎  𝑆𝐸𝑂  𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛   
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Unlike the Linear Probability Model, LPM, the response probability is not a dependent on a 
linear set of variables. As such, the coefficients are not as easily interpreted as for the LPM, 
which show the partial effect of each variable. However, it is possible to find the marginal 
effect by using the partial derivative: 
 𝜕𝑝(𝑥)𝜕𝑥! = 𝑔 𝛽! + 𝑥𝛽 𝛽! ,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝑔(𝑧) ≡ 𝑑𝐺𝑑𝑧 (𝑧) 
 
Having the marginal effect enables interpretation of how a change in the x variable affects the 
probability of y taking the value of 1. Still, even without the marginal effect the coefficient 
from the probit model can be used to study the direction of a change in the x variable. 
(Woolridge, 2003). In a probit model the regular R2 can no longer be used and instead the 
McFadden R2, also known as Pseudo R2, is used. Worth noting is that for limited probability 
models, such as the probit model, the R2 is often quite low without necessarily meaning that 
the model has a bad fit (Brooks 2008).  
 
4.2.2 Fama-­‐French	  Three	  Factor	  Model	  
The Fama-French model is an asset-pricing model developed to describe stock returns. It is an 
expanded version of CAPM that includes three factors and is defined as: 
 𝑅! − 𝑅! = 𝑏 𝑅! − 𝑅! + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀 
 
The three factors are: (𝑅! − 𝑅!) - the market risk premium, SMB - small minus big which is 
a measure of excess returns by the difference of small and large companies based on market 
cap, HML – high minus low, a measure of excess return difference for high and low book-to-
market value firms, also known as value and growth stocks. (Fama and French, 1993).  
 
4.2.3 Student’s	  t-­‐test	  
To perform a hypothesis test when the standard deviation of a population is not known, one 
can apply the Student’s t-test. A sample data is used to estimate the standard deviation of the 
population, and the data follows a t-distribution. When the sample size is large the t-
distribution tends to be very similar to the normal distribution. There are different approaches 
depending on the data, one sample, two sample or paired data but all of the tests are based on 
the null hypothesis stating that the mean difference in data is zero. (Lantz, 2009).  
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4.2.4 Wilcoxon	  signed-­‐rank	  test	  
Wilcoxon signed-rank test is the non-parametric counterpart of the Student’s t-test. Non-
parametric tests make no assumption about the data being normally or symmetrically 
distributed. Similar to the t-test, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to test if there is a 
statistical difference in the sample data but uses the median value instead of the mean. 
Moreover, the test is not as sensitive to extreme values as it ranks the sample observations 
based on their values and sums up the ranks. Hence, if there is a large deviation in the sample 
one group will consist of high ranks while the other group consists of low ranks. The test 
statistics reflects the difference between the rank totals. In addition, when there are two 
independent samples the test is know as the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test. (Conover, 1999). 
 
4.2.5 Hosmer-­‐Lemeshow	  Goodness-­‐of-­‐fit	  
As the probit model are likely to suffer from low R2 value an additional goodness-of-fit test 
will be applied to check the overall fit of the model. For the probit model a Hosmer-
Lemeshow test can be conducted. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test divides the sample into deciles 
based on predicted probabilities from which it examines the expected and observed 
frequencies and computes a chi-square value. The probability is then computed on the chi-
square distribution to test if the model fits the data, resulting in a p-value. If the p-value is 
significant the null hypothesis, which states that there is no difference in data, is rejected 
indicating that the model does not have a good fit.   
 
4.2.6 Multicollinearity	  test	  
When estimating a model with more than one explanatory variable there is a chance that the 
variables are correlated to another. If that is the case the variables are said to be 
multicollinear. A proxy for determining whether there is a potential problem with 
multicollinearity one can examine the correlations matrix for the explanatory variables. If any 
pair of the variables have a correlation in excess of 0.8 it is necessary to take action. The 
problem if multicollinearity exists is that it can be difficult to separate the effect of each of the 
variables. (Westerlund, 2005). To ensure that this is the case, a test for multicollinearity was 
conducted and the correlation matrix for the independent variables was examined.   
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5 Data	  
The following section describes the data selection process followed by descriptive statistics. 
The data tables can be found in appendix.  
5.1 Data	  selection	  	  
S&P’s Capital IQ database was used to identify PIPE transactions and information thereof 
including transaction value, date, country, PIPE price and investors. This method deviates 
from most of the prior literature (e.g. Brophy, Quimet and Sialm (2006), Dai (2007), 
Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2009), Bengtsson and Dai (2011), Ellis and Twite (2012) etc.), 
which received their data from Sagient Research’s Placementtracker database. A primary 
distinction between the two sources is that Placementtracker include more details on the PIPE 
terms, however its primary cover is the U.S. market. Similarly Capital IQ was used to identify 
SEO transactions and information thereof. Further, for accounting data the companies issuing 
PIPEs and SEOs was matched with the Compustat database. The sample was matched using 
ticker symbols, company names and ISIN codes for the issuing companies. The selection of 
accounting variables was determined to cover characteristics of a firm, such as size, operating 
performance, financial distress, expenditures and asset characteristics. Moreover, all the 
accounting data is gathered from the fiscal year prior to the issue, so if the transaction took 
place in 2011, the accounting data is from 2010. This methodology is similar to existing 
literature, and the selection of variables was also conducted with past literature in mind. 
Lastly, stock price data for PIPE issuers was collected from Thomson Reuters’s DataStream, 
during which the matching was made using company name and ticker symbols.  
 
The data sample consists of 4599 transactions issued over 1998 and 2011, whereof 1460 are 
the primary PIPE transactions, and 3139 the benchmarking SEO transactions. The sample 
used for testing firm issuing characteristics was greatly reduced by the fallout of lack of 
accounting data for the companies or because accounting data was not available for time of 
transaction. Out of the 1460 PIPE transactions, 960 could be matched, and out of the 3139 
transactions, 1536 could be matched making the testable sample 2496 transactions. For the 
stock prices 1314 out of the 1460 PIPE transactions could be matched.  
 
5.2 Summary	  statistics	  
Table 1 summarizes the transaction characteristics of the PIPE and SEO transactions during 
the period 1998 to 2011. Panel A shows that there were a total of 4599 transaction that raised 
a total amount of 1092 billion dollar. The 1460 PIPE transactions raised a total of 326 billion 
dollar while the 3139 SEO transactions raised 767 billion dollar. The ratio of number of 
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PIPEs issued corresponds to 0,47 PIPEs for every SEO issued, and in monetary value, for 
every million raised through SEOs about 0,43 million is raised through PIPEs. Panel B in 
Table 1 show that there were 903 companies issuing PIPE transactions, out of these 589 
issued just one PIPE while 314 companies issued more than one PIPE transaction. For SEOs 
there were 1585 unique companies out of which 873 issued one SEO while 712 companies 
issued more than one SEO transaction. Further, there were 518 companies that issued both a 
PIPE and a SEO transaction indicating that one out of five companies in the sample issue both 
a PIPE and a SEO, and in a majority of the cases a SEO transaction is made in a year prior to 
the PIPE issue.  
 
5.3 Transaction	  statistics	  by	  country,	  industry,	  investor	  and	  year	  
Table 2 Panel A summarizes the composition of transactions per year. It shows that the 
number of PIPE transactions is gradually increasing. A first jump in the statistics took place 
in 2006 where the number of transactions increased by almost 100 percent and reached over 
100 transactions. Another noticeable point in time occurred around the financials crisis in 
2008 where the capital raised in PIPE transactions exceeded 100 billion dollars, with total 
capital raised at 102,17 billion dollars over 148 transactions. Relative to SEOs, the period 
around the dot-com bubble indicates an important period where the number of PIPE 
transactions exceeded the corresponding number of SEOs. Although the number of PIPE 
transactions has exceeded SEOs, the capital raised for each point in time is higher for the SEO 
transactions. 
 
Panel B summarizes the composition of PIPE and SEO transactions per country. Most of the 
PIPE transactions have taken place in the United Kingdom followed by Germany and France. 
Similarly, these three countries represent most of the capital raised summing up at about 50 
percent. The sample is relatively divided where the top half of the countries represent 90 
percent of the capital raised and two thirds of the number of transactions. Notable is that 
Ireland, Belgium and Spain have the highest mean capital raised per transaction, which relates 
to a few large financial institution transactions, which further shows in Panel C. A similar 
pattern exists for SEO transactions.  
 
Panel C the industry composition is rendered. The subprime crisis left many financial 
institutions in bad shape and this is distinguished as slightly over 70 percent of the capital 
raised through PIPEs are in the financial sector, and for SEOs the comparable value is just 
below 60 percent. Moreover, it can be concluded that many of the PIPE issuing companies are 
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active in capital expenditure and R&D intense industries such as Healthcare, Information 
Technology and Energy.  
 
Panel D summarize the PIPE investor profiles. It should be noted that the information related 
to the type of investor is limited for the sample; two thirds of the transactions have 
unspecified investor type. As such, results relating to the investors should be approached with 
some precaution. Out of the reported investors, there are distinguishable features; Private 
Equity and Venture Capital firms represent 19 percent of the transactions and 11 percent of 
the capital raised while Sovereign institutions stands for almost half of the capital raised but 
less than 2 percent of the transactions.  
 
5.4 Issuer	  and	  transaction	  characteristics	  
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics used for testing issuer characteristics and transaction 
details of relevance for the regulatory impact and relevance of the PIPE market. Panel A 
summarizes the raw data while Panel B depicts the transformed variables. Companies issuing 
PIPEs tend to be worse performing as compared to the firms issuing SEOs. Although the asset 
turnover ratio (revenue/assets) tells otherwise the EBITDA ratio as well as the stock 
performance leading up to the issue is worse for the average PIPE firm. Companies that 
obtain funding through PIPEs tend to have a higher book-to-market ratio and be more levered 
than companies obtaining funding through SEOs. Additionally, companies turning to the 
PIPE market tend to have equivalent levels of capital expenditures to SEO issuers, marginally 
more cash on their balance sheet while their R&D expenditure is significantly higher. On a 
contrasting note, the intangibles ratio is lower among PIPE issuers. In Panel B it shows that 
the median asset of a firm issuing a PIPE is 74,96 million USD while the median asset for the 
SEO issuer is about half the size at 35,27 million USD. However, if instead looking at the 
average size of assets, companies issuing SEOs tend to be significantly larger than the PIPE 
issuer. The difference in average is also significantly larger as the SEO issuer is close to nine 
times the size of the PIPE issuer. Also, the average company issuing a PIPE tend to be older 
than those issuing SEOs. 
 
In respect of the transaction characteristics the issue fraction differs quite substantially 
between the two transaction types. While the mean and median transaction size among PIPE 
issuers are 20,9 percent and 9,8 percent respectively, the corresponding number among SEO 
issuers are 29,5 percent and 17,6 percent. The average capital raised in SEO transactions is 
also above that of PIPEs.  
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Table 4 illustrates the post-issue return characteristics of PIPE issuers. The short-term 
performance following the transaction indicates a tendency for positive returns. Contrary, 
down the line, the result shifts to the negative where the one-year median buy-and-hold return 
is -12,90 percent. The standard deviations for the returns are noticeably large with the one-
year return standard deviation of 69,30 percent, indicating the wide scattering of the returns 
among the issuers. Furthermore, looking at the return in relation to the investor it shows that 
companies can benefit from raising capital from Private Equity or Venture Capital investors. 
The one-year mean return for issuers with PE/VC investors is 7,89 percent while issuers 
getting capital from other investors have a mean return of -3,13 percent. However, looking at 
the median return for the two groups, the difference is close to three percent.  
 
6 Empirical	  Results	  and	  Analysis	  
In this section I present and analyse the empirical findings related to the research questions 
presented in section 3.  
 
Table 5 summarize the regression results from the probit model, which was applied to test for 
firm characteristics, importance of PIPEs and the institutional settings in Europe. The variable 
definitions are found in appendix a, the specified model can be found in appendix b, and the 
related Hosmer-Lemeshow test results and correlation matrix for the explanatory variables 
can be found in appendix c and d respectively. 
 
6.1 Firm	  characteristics	  
The regression analysis shows that there are five variables that are found significantly related 
to the choice of a PIPE transaction, Cash/Assets, EBITDA/Assets, Ln Assets, Pre-LTM 
Return and R&D/Assets. The EBITDA ratio is found significant on a five percent level and 
the pre-issue return is significant on a ten percent level. Both of the variables have negative 
coefficients, which indicate that as the EBITDA ratio and the pre-issue return decrease, the 
likelihood of a PIPE transaction increase. Cash/Assets is found significant on a five percent 
level and with a positive coefficient it shows that the proportion of cash to assets increase the 
likelihood of the transaction being a PIPE with a 0,215 unit change for each one unit change 
in Cash/Assets. This insinuates that companies issuing PIPEs tend to have a higher proportion 
of cash in relation to assets compared to SEO issuers. Likewise, R&D/Assets is found 
significant at one percent level and with a positive coefficient implying that there are 
proportionately high levels of R&D expenditure among PIPE issuers. Both the cash and the 
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R&D ratio have the highest standard error among the significant variables, which suggest that 
their results should be approached with some precaution as the implication is that these ratios 
vary quite a lot among the sampled firms. Related to size, the asset variable is significant on 
the one percent level. Surprisingly the coefficient is positive, implying that larger firms are 
more likely to issue a PIPE transaction. Moreover, the remaining variables cannot be said to 
have a significant effect related to the choice of a PIPE transaction.  
 
My findings of the poor operating performance of PIPE issuers is consistent with previous 
research, see for example Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2006) and Brophy, Quimet and Siam 
(2009). While Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2006) found that the majority of firms have a 
negative operating performance leading up to the PIPE issue, my results are somewhat 
inconclusive as the mean value of EBITDA is positive. This could relate to some outliers, 
which seems like a reasonable assumption given that the median EBITDA value is negative 
and both EBITDA/Asset variable take on negative values. Notable is that even though the 
mean EBITDA value of PIPE issuers is positive, the value is just 5 percent of the 
corresponding SEO issuer. Furthermore, the regression analysis provide a significant result 
with a negative coefficient implying that even though PIPE issuers not necessarily have 
negative operating performance they tend to be poor performers in the context, and that the 
bleak performance may pose difficulties raising capital in the public equity or debt market.  
 
In line with Chen, Dai and Schatzberg (2009) and their undervaluation hypothesis, I also find 
that the pre-issue performance of PIPE issuing companies is negative as seen by the median 
value. As for the EBITDA variable, the mean value of the pre-issue return is positive which 
relates to outliers. Yet, even the mean value can provide some insight on the differences in 
returns compared to SEO issuers. Firstly, both the mean and the median value of SEOs are 
non-negative, which provide support that companies are more likely to issue equity in the 
public space when the stock price performance is positive. Secondly, the difference in the 
mean return for PIPE and SEO issuers is almost 10 percent which imply that even if returns 
are not negative, companies with a strong stock performance are more likely to make a public 
offering than approach private investors as is evident from the regression analysis.   
 
Coherent with existing literature is also the findings of high R&D expenditures among PIPE 
issuers. Among the significant variables in the regression analysis, the coefficient positive 
R&D ratio has the highest marginal effect, which indicates a strong relationship for R&D 
intense companies issuing PIPEs. In conjunction with the industry data in table 4 panel c, this 
result provide support that a large portion of the firms issuing PIPEs are active in R&D 
intense industries such as Healthcare and Information Technology. Raising financing via the 
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PIPE market might be an effective way for this type of companies to obtain capital as their 
uncertain prospects may pose difficulties in raising capital from the public equity and debt 
markets. In addition, the need to raise capital in fast way could be important factor to keep the 
investment levels and their research going.  
 
In contrast to the findings of Ellis and Twite (2012) I found that PIPE issuers are cash rich 
with a high proportion of cash compared to their SEO counterparts. Given the findings of 
R&D intense firms, the cash ratio was expected to be negative for PIPE issuers. I see two 
possible explanations why this might be the case. Firstly, the high cash holdings are related to 
the R&D intense firms as their uncertain prospects and on-going need for financing require 
them to hold high levels of cash. Secondly, the high level of cash holdings relate to other than 
the R&D intense firms and may come as a precautionary buffer given that the time-period 
studied includes two financial crises.  
 
A second surprising finding is that my regression results indicate that firms tapping the PIPE 
market are larger than their SEO equivalent. This goes in contrast to what the majority of 
previous research has found, e.g. Brophy, Quimet and Sialm (2006), Dai (2007), Chaplinsky 
and Haushalter (2009) and Bengtsson and Dai (2011). Although this study lacks a measure of 
information asymmetry, the previous research has used analyst estimate and coverage as a 
measure. Given that all companies in the sample are publicly listed, I find it reasonable that a 
large firm would have a fairly good coverage, which could further provide a hint that 
information asymmetry might not be as pronounced in the European market as in the U.S. 
Still, this suggestion should be approached with caution as the data tables show that the mean 
asset value of the PIPE issuer is about 10 percent of the SEO firm. A further exploration of 
the firm size in relation to the importance of the PIPE market will be discussed in a later 
section of the analysis.  
 
Unlike previous PIPE research, my study failed to find a significant relation between the 
financial distress of a firm and the contingent use of the PIPE market. There are indicative 
results of PIPE issuers having a higher book-to-market ratio, a measure that Chaplinsky and 
Haushalter (2009) applied as a measure of financial distress, which seems reasonable given 
the negative pre-issue stock performance, and be more levered than comparable SEO issuers 
but as the result are non-significant in the regression analysis it cannot be said that financial 
distress is a significant factor among PIPE issuers. Also, indicative results related to 
intangibles hint that the intangibles ratio is lower for PIPE issuers than for SEOs, which are 
surprising given the significant levels of R&D expenditures.  
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6.2 Importance	  of	  the	  PIPE	  market	  
In terms of the role of the PIPE market the variable LnTransaction was included in the 
regression analysis. This variable was found significant at the one percent level suggesting 
that the size of the transaction is a distinct factor separating the PIPE and SEO market. The 
negative coefficient denotes that the smaller the transaction is, the more likely is it that it will 
be a PIPE transaction rather than a SEO issuance.  
 
That PIPE transactions in general are smaller than SEO transactions is in line what was 
expected and also consistent with the existing literature. For example, Ellis and Twite (2012) 
found that the number of PIPE transactions were twice as many as SEO transactions while the 
capital raised from PIPEs corresponded to only about 15 percent as from SEOs. As mentioned 
previously, the majority of firms turning the PIPE market are active within R&D intense 
industries and with the uncertain prospects of these firms along with the evidence of poor 
performance among PIPE issuers, it should come as no surprise that the investments are, what 
Ellis and Twite (2012) refers to, a bet on growth options and that the willingness to invest 
large amounts in such prospective are limited. This is not necessarily a bad thing as the PIPE 
market thereby takes on a role as a supplement to the SEO market catering to the needs of 
firms unable to obtain financing from the public equity and debt markets, which according to 
Dai, Jo and Schatzberg (2008) have helped to improve the market environment for these type 
of firms. This could be a leading factor for the relative increase in PIPE transactions 
compared to SEOs. Although the difference is fairly inconclusive over a longer period, the 
last three years has seen the proportion of PIPEs to SEOs grow from about 30 percent to close 
to 40 percent indicating that the PIPE market is gaining momentum. In addition, the 
significant findings of firm size discussed in the previous section may add an additional layer 
related to the development of the PIPE market as these findings are in line with what Gormley 
(2006) presented regarding that the PIPE market has begun to attract larger established firms. 
In addition, Hodge (2010) insinuate that the use of the PIPE market also has developed as 
firms regardless of size may use it to revise their balance sheet, which my findings can 
provide some support to given the boom of the PIPE market in the years surrounding the 
financial crisis.  
 
6.3 Institutional	  settings	  
The issue fraction variable was included in the test model to see how the size of the 
transaction relates to the share capital of the firm. It shows that there is a linkage between 
PIPE transactions and the fraction issued as the variable is statistically significant at a five 
percent level. In addition, the relation indicate that there is a distinction between PIPEs and 
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SEO as the proportion of equity issued in relation to the share capital is smaller for PIPEs as 
is specified by the negative coefficient.  
 
The actual regulatory impact of the European PIPE market is difficult to measure by the 
means of this paper as it requires more of an qualitative approach, but the findings related to 
the issue fraction should provide some insight to how the institutional settings in Europe 
affect the PIPE market. The most restrictive of the regulations that PIPE issuers face in 
Europe is the existing shareholders pre-emptive rights. My findings for fraction of equity 
issued show a mean value of 20,9 percent and a median of 9,8 percent. The latter of these 
findings are of special interest since the number relates closely to the regulatory frameworks 
that exist. Out of the PIPE transactions that took place between 1998 and 2011, 360, 191 and 
182 took place in the U.K., Germany and France respectively. These add up to about half of 
the total transactions issued. Interestingly, these three countries have a boundary making it 
easier to overcome the pre-emptive rights if the new equity issue does not exceed 10 percent.  
Given that these three countries represent half of the issued transactions it stands reasonable 
to assume that median issue fraction is related to these nations and the 10 percent limit, which 
indicate that the regulations do play an important role in the European PIPE market. Further 
support of this can be drawn by the distinctively higher issue fraction for SEO transactions, 
which is also signified from the regression analysis. In addition, the higher mean value 
indicate that there are transactions where a substantial portion of the share capital has been 
issued and that shareholders are willing to waive their rights if the situation calls for it. 
Another interpretation of the mean value is that the mandatory takeover offer rule, which 
comes to effect at an ownership of 30 percent of the share capital or voting rights, is an upper 
limit few investors are willing to exceed. On a speculative note, the high mean value could be 
related to the rather strong presence of Private Equity and Venture Capital investors, which 
given their business model would be more willing to take an significant ownership share than 
the average investor.  
 
6.4 Post-­‐issue	  stock	  performance	  
Table 6 summarize the results from the post-issue performance tests using both Student’s t-
test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. In the first row of Panel A it shows that the 7-day 
returns are significant on a one and five percent level respectively. The positive mean value 
confirms that PIPE issuers on average experience a positive effect in the short run. The 
abnormal returns compared to the market for the entire time-period have an annual mean 
return of -8,6 percent and a median return of -18,6 percent. Measured to the Fama-French 
Three Factor model, the abnormal return is -10,2 percent compared to the mean and -17,4 
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percent compared to the median. The results are valid on a one percent level. Moreover, 
breaking down the time-period, the overall results are fairly conclusive, across the mean and 
the median, compared to both the market and the Fama-French model, the stock performance 
of the PIPE issuer tend to underperform the benchmarked models. The one deviation is found 
in the year between 1998 and 2006 where there was a non-significant abnormal return 
compared to the market with a mean return of -1,3 percent. Relating the performance based 
on investor, the results show that firms that raise capital from Private Equity and Venture 
Capital investors experience a non-significant negative abnormal return compared to the 
market, -1,9 percent, yet significantly underperform the Fama-French model, -8,3 percent. For 
firms that obtain financing from other investors it is displays that these firms experience a 
significantly negative stock return both compared to the market and the Fama-French model, -
10,3 and 10,6 percent respectively.  The median value for both classes of investors signifies 
negative abnormal performance where the return for Private Equity and Venture Capital firms 
are -11,6 and -16,5 percent relative the market and Fama-French model, and for other 
investors -19,4 and -17,6 percent correspondingly. Also, the difference between the investors 
classes show that other investors significantly underperform relative to Private Equity and 
Venture Capital investors. Noteworthy is the high standard deviation for the abnormal returns, 
which range from 60 to 70 percent.  
 
In line with my findings, previous work show that stock returns of companies issuing PIPEs, 
are positive in the short-term. Both Hertzel et al. (2002) and Ellis and Twite (2012) indicate 
that the positive return in the short-term is related to anticipations of the future prospects of 
the issuing firm. Their suggestions are applicable to my results, as a large share of the PIPE 
issuers in my sample tends to be R&D intense firms with uncertain, yet perhaps opportunistic, 
prospects. Consequently, although I find that PIPE issuers incline to be poor performers, the 
investors may see new opportunities ahead, which could yield positive returns. The inverse 
relationship between the short-term and long-term performance of my findings pose for an 
interesting parallel to the underpricing of initial public offerings, IPO. As PIPEs and IPOs are 
both a mean of financing with corresponding uncertain prospects and information asymmetry, 
the case of underpricing in PIPEs may help to explain the inverse return relation.  
 
In addition, along with the findings of Dai (2007) I find that the investor could be of 
importance for the post-issue return. The average return compared to the market is roughly 8 
percent better for the firms raising capital from Private Equity or Venture Capital firms than 
for those raising financing from other investors. The better performance is also valid 
compared to Fama-French, however the difference is less distinct. Wruck (1989) presented 
arguments regarding concentration of ownership and alignment of interest as an explanatory 
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factor for positive returns. Although his findings were based on the announcement effect, they 
could help explain the difference between Private Equity and Venture Capital investors, 
relative to other investors over the long-term, as especially Venture Capital firms are used to 
dealing with uncertain prospects and alignment of interests. Nonetheless, it stands to reason 
that the issuer could benefit from which type of investor it obtains funding and that having a 
Private Equity or Venture Capital investor could signal commitment and performance.  
 
7 Conclusion	  
In this section I present my conclusions and suggestions for further research.  
7.1 Concluding	  remarks	  
Private Investments in Public Equity first emerged in the U.S. in the early 1990’s where the 
financing form catered to small healthcare and technology firms. As the financial crisis paved 
its way, PIPEs as a financing form grew to become an established financing form in the U.S. 
During this period, the PIPE market also begun to spread internationally. Existing literature 
have primarily covered the U.S. market, hence the contribution of this paper was to study the 
importance of the PIPE market in Europe and the characteristics of the firms using PIPE 
transactions.  
 
When analysing a total sample consisting of 1460 PIPE transactions and 3139 SEO 
transactions in the time period between 1998 and 2011 I find, consistent with Chaplinsky and 
Haushalter (2009), that companies issuing PIPE transactions tend to have a weak operating 
performance and experience a negative return for the twelve months leading up to the 
transaction. I show that PIPE issuers are often from industries such as Healthcare and 
Information Technology, which corresponds to my findings that PIPE issuing companies have 
seemingly high levels of R&D expenditure and large cash holdings. The implication of my 
finding suggest that the uncertain prospects and poor performance of the PIPE issuers may 
pose difficulties in raising capital through the public equity or debt market. Yet, the issuing 
firms are relatively large.  
 
To evaluate the importance of the PIPE markets I studied the transaction characteristics in 
Europe and show that the average PIPE transaction is smaller than the comparable SEO 
transactions, and that this finding could relate to the weak fundamentals of the issuing firms 
and an unwillingness from investors to inject large amounts of capital in risky prospects. This 
further suggests that the PIPE market acts as a supplement to the SEO market by providing to 
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the needs of firms unable to raise financing in the public space, which is consistent with the 
findings of Chen, Dai and Schatzbrg (2009). Further, I find evidence that the PIPE market has 
developed to cater not only the needs of small firms through my related findings of firm size 
and the boom years of the PIPE market around the financial crisis.  
 
My results also show that the institutional settings may pose as a hinder for the development 
of the PIPE market in Europe. My findings show that the issue fraction for PIPE transactions 
is just below 10 percent, which is where the pre-emptive rights regulation becomes stricter in 
some of the key European jurisdictions. This indicates that the pre-emptive rights and the 10 
percent threshold are an issue for the PIPE issuers, which could also help to explain my 
findings related to the small transaction sizes.   
 
Lastly, consistent with Brophy, Quimet and Sialm (2006), my empirical findings show that 
the short-term stock return for PIPE issuers is positive but that there is an inverse relationship 
in the long run where the PIPE issuers experience a negative abnormal performance. 
Furthermore, my findings signify that an issue can benefit from raising capital from a Private 
Equity or Venture Capital firm. Which suggests that having Private Equity or Venture Capital 
firm as an investor could act as a certification of commitment and performance.  
 
7.2 Suggestions	  for	  further	  research	  
As the research on PIPEs in a European context is, to say the least, scarce, there are areas in 
this paper, which could be explored further and additional research areas that could be 
studied. For instance, given my findings of the importance of the investor it would be 
interesting to examine the role of the investor to a greater extent by examining their profile 
and how their experience of PIPE investing relates to the performance of the issuing firms. In 
addition, to my knowledge, the research covering the operating performance of PIPE 
investors extends only to map the characteristics of the firms before the issue. Hence, looking 
at both the pre and post-issue operating performance could be an interesting topic to see how 
the firms manage on an operating level after they have raised financing. Another approach of 
interest could be to do a similar to Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2009) and examine how 
contract terms affect both the operating and stock performance. Finally, longer down the line 
it would be interesting to do a replication of this study to see how these results hold for a 
greater sample and longer period.  
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9 Appendix	  
 
Appendix A: Variable definition 
 
BE/ME Book value of Equity to Market Value of Equity. Book value of 
Equity is from the financial statement in the year prior to issue while 
Market Value of Equity is from one day prior to issue 
 
Capex/Assets Capital Expenditures and Total Assets, both from the financial 
statement in the fiscal year prior to the issue 
 
Cash/Assets Cash and Cash Equivalents and Total Assets, both from the financial 
statement in the fiscal year prior to the issue 
 
Debt/Assets Long Term Debt and Total Assets, both from the financial statement 
in the fiscal year prior to the issue 
 
EBITDA/Assets Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization and 
Total Assets, both from the financial statement in the year prior to 
issue  
 
Excess Return The one-year return minus the risk free rate based on weekly stock 
data 
 
HML High Minus Low, a measure of excess return difference for high and 
low book-to-market value firms 
 
Intangibles/Assets Intangible Assets and Total Assets, both numbers from the financial 
statements in the fiscal year prior to the issue 
 
IssueFraction The Transaction Value to Market Value of Equity one day prior to 
issue and transaction value is a reported number  
 
LnAssets The natural logarithm of Total Assets, number taken from the 
financial statement in the last fiscal year prior to issue 
 
LnTransaction  The natural logarithm of the Transaction Value, reported number 
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Long-term Return The one-year stock return based on weekly stock data 
 
PIPE Private Investment in Public Equity, when publicly listed companies 
turn to sophisticated private investors to raise new capital 
 
Pre-LTMReturn The stock return in the last twelve months before the issue 
 
RD/Assets Research & Development expenditures and Total Assets, from the 
financial statement in the year prior to the issue 
 
Revenue/Assets Revenue and Total Assets numbers from the financial statement the 
last fiscal year prior to the issue 
 
Rm-Rf Market risk premium, defined as the market return, Rm, minus the 
risk free rate, Rf 
 
SEO Secondary Equity Offering, when publicly listed companies raise 
new capital from existing shareholders 
 
Short-term Return The one week stock return following the issue 
 
SMB Small Minus Big, a measure of excess returns by the difference of 
small and large companies based on market capitlization 
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Appendix B: The applied Probit Model 
Based on the explanatory variables and existing literature the model to test issuer and deal 
characteristics was constructed as follows:  
 𝑦!"!# =   𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸 + 𝛽! 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽! 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠+ 𝛽! 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽! 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠+ 𝛽! 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽! 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽! 𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠+ 𝛽! 𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽!" 𝑃𝑟𝑒 − 𝐿𝑇𝑀𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛+ 𝛽!! 𝑅𝐷/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽!" 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
 
Where  𝑦!"!#  is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the transaction is a PIPE and 0 if the 
transaction is a SEO. βi are coefficients where the first one is the intercept term, and the 
explanatory variables are within brackets. A definition of the variables can be found in 
Appendix A.  EBITDA/Assets and Revenue/Assets are used as measures of operating 
performance; Pre-LTMReturn is used as a measure of stock performance and underpricing; 
BE/ME and Debt/Assets are used as measure of financial distress; Cash/Assets, 
Intangibles/Assets, Capex/Assets and RD/Assets are used to measure asset and expenditure 
profile; LnAssets is used to measure firm size; LnTransaction is used to measure the relation 
of transaction size and choice of financing; and IssueFraction is used to study how the 
regulation relates to fraction of capital raised. ε is the error term.  
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Appendix C: Hosmer-Lemeshow Test 
The table summarizes the result from the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test of the Probit 
model. Provided the relatively low R-squared value of the model, the Hosmer-Lemeshow test was 
conducted to ensure that there was a good fit with the model. The null hypothesis states that the 
model fits the data. The high p-value from chi-square indicates that the model fits the data well.  
  Quantile of Risk Dep = 0 Dep = 1 Total H-L 
  Low High Actual Expect Actual Expect Obs Value 
         1 0,006 0,133 84 84,819 9 8,181 93 0,090 
2 0,134 0,179 79 78,297 14 14,703 93 0,040 
3 0,180 0,222 75 74,338 18 18,662 93 0,029 
4 0,223 0,258 74 71,411 20 22,590 94 0,391 
5 0,258 0,302 67 66,888 26 26,112 93 0,001 
6 0,303 0,347 62 62,862 31 30,138 93 0,036 
7 0,348 0,402 60 58,801 34 35,200 94 0,065 
8 0,402 0,459 56 53,011 37 39,989 93 0,392 
9 0,460 0,559 38 46,355 55 46,646 93 3,002 
10 0,563 0,995 31 29,709 63 64,291 94 0,082 
    Total 626 626,489 307 306,511 933 4,128 
H-L Statistic: 4,128  
  
Prob. Chi-Sq(8) 0,845 
Andrews Statistic: 5,565    
Prob. Chi-Sq(10) 0,850 
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Appendix D: Correlation matrix for explanatory variables 
The table shows the correlation between the independent variables from the Probit model regression. 
All variables have a correlation less than the critical value of 0.8 indicating that there is no 
multicollinearity. 
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BE / ME 1            
Capex / Assets 0,004 1           
Cash / Assets -0,092 -0,124 1          
Debt / Assets -0,021 0,046 -0,095 1         
EBITDA / Assets 0,078 0,068 -0,349 -0,116 1        
Intangibles / Assets 0,080 -0,185 -0,311 0,029 0,139 1       
Issue Fraction 0,182 -0,081 -0,038 0,021 -0,035 0,043 1      
LnAssets 0,217 0,096 -0,308 0,047 0,420 -0,037 -0,068 1     
LnTransaction -0,044 0,095 -0,109 0,052 0,252 -0,107 0,126 0,761 1    
Pre-LTMReturn -0,094 -0,053 0,063 -0,036 -0,003 -0,033 -0,132 -0,037 0,068 1   
RD / Assets -0,082 -0,114 0,463 0,252 -0,457 -0,188 0,009 -0,301 -0,148 0,012 1  
Revenue / Assets -0,029 -0,058 -0,243 -0,009 0,362 -0,111 0,066 0,034 -0,026 0,025 -0,005 1 
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Table 1: Summary of Transactions 
The table summarizes in Panel A the characteristics of transactions by PIPE, SEO, total and the ratio 
comparison of PIPE to SEO data. Panel B summarize the firm issuance profile of PIPEs, SEOs and 
both. 
 
Panel A: Characteristics of Transactions         
  PIPEs SEOs 
All 
Transactions PIPE vs SEO 
Number of Transactions 1 460 3 139 4 599 47% 
Total Capital Raised (in USDm) 325 830 766 664 1 092 494 42% 
Mean Capital Raised (in USDm) 223,17 244,24 237,55 91% 
Median Capital Raised (in USDm) 7,76 9,27 8,73 84% 
Mean Issue Fraction  22,77% 29,18% 27,22% 78% 
Median Issue Fraction 9,97% 17,01% 14,78% 59% 
      Panel B: Firm Issuance Profile           
  
One 
Transaction 
Two+ 
Transactions PIPE and SEO Sum 
PIPE 589 314 - 903 
SEO 873 712 - 1585 
Both - - 518 (21%) 
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Table 2: Number of Transactions and Capital Raised 
The table summarize the number of transactions and the capital raised and the mean capital raised 
by in Panel A year, in Panel B country, in Panel C industry and in Panel D for PIPE transactions 
only by Investor.  
 
Panel A: Number of Transactions and Capital Raised per Year        
  PIPE SEO 
Year 
Number of 
Transactions 
Capital 
Raised 
Mean 
Capital 
Raised 
Number of 
Transactions 
Capital 
Raised 
Mean 
Capital 
Raised 
1998 5  2 026     405,3 10  3 431     343,1 
1999 1  53     53,1 18  18 794     1044,1 
2000 16  906     56,6 34  15 810     465,0 
2001 27  3 156     116,9 22  12 138     551,7 
2002 30  4 687     156,2 28  10 408     371,7 
2003 32  1 523     47,6 52  10 361     199,2 
2004 62  1 813     29,2 57  6 802     119,3 
2005 99  10 533     106,4 165  36 211     219,5 
2006 190  22 374     117,8 233  63 087     270,8 
2007 197  34 653     175,9 240  56 544     235,6 
2008 148  102 169     690,3 322  178 495     554,3 
2009 217  94 330     434,7 731  215 901     295,3 
2010 230  16 974     73,8 674  75 934     112,7 
2011 206  30 633     148,7 553  62 751     113,5 
 
 
      Panel B: Number of Transactions and Capital Raised per Country  
  
  PIPE SEO 
Country 
Number of 
Transactions 
Capital 
Raised 
Mean 
Capital 
Raised 
Number of 
Transactions 
Capital 
Raised 
Mean 
Capital 
Raised 
Austria  10  3 023     302,3 45  19 178     426,2 
Belgium  46  31 406     682,7 29  31 661     1091,7 
Cyprus   19  1 889     99,4 27  2 965     109,8 
Denmark  20  2 230     111,5 63  19 610     311,3 
Finland  25  1 537     61,5 42  3 332     79,3 
France  182  29 318     161,1 281  110 767     394,2 
Germany  191  56 165     294,1 189  52 783     279,3 
Greece  39  7 628     195,6 79  25 684     325,1 
Ireland  37  28 942     782,2 124  46 157     372,2 
Italy  35  2 223     63,5 80  63 227     790,3 
Luxembourg  14  2 076     148,3 16  5 611     350,7 
Netherlands  46  19 190     417,2 49  27 730     565,9 
Norway  181  7 479     41,3 145  15 752     108,6 
Spain  42  22 479     535,2 56  47 551     849,1 
Sweden  156  2 153     13,8 314  19 870     63,3 
Switzerland  57  24 778     434,7 64  45 467     710,4 
United Kingdom  360  83 313     231,4 1536  229 319     149,3 
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       Panel C: Number of Transactions and Capital Raised by Industry      
  PIPE SEO 
Industry 
Number of 
Transactions 
Capital 
Raised 
Mean 
Capital 
Raised 
Number of 
Transactions 
Capital 
Raised 
Mean 
Capital 
Raised 
Consumer 
Discretionary 165  17 492     106,0 385  43 342     112,6 
Consumer Staples 42  3 985     94,9 74  36 397     491,9 
Energy 201  8 394     41,8 369  29 075     78,8 
Financials 174  235 756     1354,9 340  440 755     1296,3 
Healthcare 229  8 546     37,3 436  18 095     41,5 
Industrials 175  14 708     84,0 469  59 829     127,6 
Information 
Technology 247  6 320     25,6 481  28 291     58,8 
Materials 166  14 069     84,8 473  54 038     114,2 
Telecommunication 
Services 21  4 796     228,4 39  14 342     367,7 
Utilities 40  11 766     294,2 73  42 500     582,2 
 
 
 
     Panel D: Number of Transactions and Capital Raised in PIPEs by Investor  
  
Investor 
Number of 
Transactions 
% of 
Transactions Capital Raised % of Capital 
  Unspecified 978 66,99% 136 755  41,97% 
  Corporate Pension Plan 1 0,07% 150  0,05% 
  Endowment Fund Sponsor 2 0,14% 430  0,13% 
  Foundation Fund Sponsor 1 0,07% 4  0,00% 
  Hedge Fund Manager 49 3,36% 1 165  0,36% 
  Insurance Company 4 0,27% 3 085  0,95% 
  PE/VC 276 18,90% 36 924  11,33% 
  Private 44 3,01% 6 438  1,98% 
  Sovereign Wealth Fund 22 1,51% 127 700  39,19% 
  Traditional Investment Manager 83 5,68% 13 179  4,04% 
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Table 3: Issuer characteristics 
The table summarizes in Panel the mean and median variables that have been tested in the 
regression analysis by transaction type. Panel B summarize the untransformed mean and 
median data variables upon which the regression variables are based. 
 
Panel A: Regression Variables       
 PIPE SEO 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
Book-to-Market 1,584 0,407 1,182 0,336 
Capex/Assets 0,064 0,030 0,062 0,026 
Cash/Assets 0,180 0,102 0,171 0,094 
Debt/Assets 0,165 0,075 0,147 0,031 
EBITDA/Assets -0,175 -0,015 -0,143 -0,027 
Intangibles/Assets 0,227 0,151 0,261 0,172 
Issue Fraction 0,209 0,098 0,295 0,176 
Ln Assets 4,647 4,326 4,034 3,591 
Ln Transacation 2,500 2,188 2,700 2,269 
Pre-LTM Return 0,143 -0,009 0,240 0,002 
R&D/Assets 0,188 0,053 0,114 0,010 
Revenue/Assets 0,774 0,562 0,684 0,474 
 
 
    Panel B: Data Variables       
 
PIPE SEO 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
Assets 7 693,17 74,96 67 871,64 35,27 
Book Equity 835,94 33,88 476,03 18,42 
Capex 757,11 1,78 4 700,29 0,76 
Cash & CE 917,88 6,01 2 091,90 1,95 
Debt 1 039,70 2,84 9 526,16 0,62 
EBITDA 693,74 -0,28 12 367,20 -0,33 
Intangibles 771,25 7,45 4 299,59 4,98 
Market Cap 1 254,87 75,78 1 094,88 54,83 
Pre-LTM Return 0,14 -0,01 0,24 0,00 
R&D 81,05 7,90 44,52 1,79 
Revenue 6 228,76 30,97 65 829,08 12,10 
Transaction Value 84,29 7,92 140,23 8,67 
Firm Age 24,07 8,00 20,75 6,00 
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Table 4: Post-issue stock return of PIPE issuers 
The table summarize the stock return after the PIPE issue. The returns are presented as buy-
and-hold returns for one week, one year and the one-year excess return compared to the risk 
free rate.  
Panel A: Summarized PIPE Returns   
 
One week return One year return One year excess return 
Mean 2,86% -0,96% -2,67% 
Median 0,00% -12,90% -15,23% 
Stddev 17,93% 69,30% 69,20% 
    
Panel B: PIPE Returns per Investor Type 
  
PE/VC Investors One week return One year return One year excess return 
Mean 1,81% 7,89% 6,15% 
Median 0,00% -10,74% -13,35% 
Stddev 11,56% 78,69% 78,63% 
    Other Investors 
  Mean 3,13% -3,13% -4,83% 
Median 0,00% -13,83% -16,02% 
Stddev 19,22% 66,67% 66,56% 
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Table 5: Determinants of PIPE transactions 
The table summarizes the results of the probit model regression of factors affecting the choice 
of a PIPE issuance. The dependent variable is set equal to 1 if transaction is a PIPE and to 0 if 
it is a SEO. Firm characteristic variables are scaled with total assets and transaction size and 
total assets are normalized to correct for skewness in data.  
***, **, *, denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.  
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect Std. Error P-value 
Intercept -1,197 *** -0,479 0,206 0,000 
Book-to-Market -0,020 -0,008 0,012 0,104 
Capex/Assets -1,385 -0,554 0,971 0,154 
Cash/Assets 0,538 ** 0,215 0,258 0,037 
Debt/Assets 0,015 0,006 0,144 0,918 
EBITDA/Assets -0,235 ** -0,094 0,110 0,033 
Intangibles/Assets -0,378 -0,151 0,237 0,111 
Issue Fraction -0,463 ** -0,185 0,216 0,032 
Ln Assets 0,278 *** 0,111 0,040 0,000 
Ln Transaction -0,223 *** -0,089 0,043 0,000 
Pre-LTM Return -0,080 * -0,032 0,048 0,099 
R&D/Assets 0,788 *** 0,315 0,234 0,001 
Revenue/Assets 0,083 0,033 0,069 0,229 
Observations after adjustment (1/0) 933 (307/626)   
McFadden R-squared (in %)  11,2   
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Table 6: Post-issue stock performance of PIPE issuers 
The table summarizes the stock performance of companies issuing PIPEs. The short-term effect is 
measured as a 7-day buy-and-hold return. The abnormal returns are presented on an annual basis. In 
Panel A the returns are illustrated for the full sample period and two sub-samples, to examine any 
difference in performance before and after the financial crisis. Panel B display the returns by the 
different investor classes. WMW denotes p-value from Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test 
***, **, *, denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.  
 
Panel A: Stock Return by time-period  
    
 
Obs. after 
adjustments Std.dev 
Sample 
mean 
Student's 
t-test p-
value 
Sample 
median 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
test p-value 
1998-2011 
      7-day B-H Return 1256 0,179 0,029 *** 0,000 0,000 ** 0,025 
Abnormal Return vs 
Market 1303 0,636 -0,086 *** 0,000 -0,186 *** 0,000 
Fama-French 3-Factor 
alpha 1303 0,644 -0,102 *** 0,000 -0,174 *** 0,000 
       1998-2006 
      Abnormal Return vs 
Market 386 0,714 -0,013 0,720 -0,129 *** 0,002 
Fama-French 3-Factor 
alpha 386 0,725 -0,157 *** 0,000 -0,274 *** 0,000 
       2007-2011 
      Abnormal Return vs 
Market 917 0,598 -0,117 *** 0,000 -0,207 *** 0,000 
Fama-French 3-Factor 
alpha 917 0,606 -0,078 *** 0,000 -0,137 *** 0,000 
 
 
      Panel B: Stock return by investor type 
     
 
Obs. after 
adjustments Std.dev 
Sample 
mean 
Student's 
t-test p-
value 
Sample 
median 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
test p-value 
PE/VC 
      Abnormal Return vs 
Market 256 0,732 -0,019 0,681 -0,116 *** 0,007 
Fama-French 3-Factor 
alpha 256 0,737 -0,083 * 0,071 -0,165 *** 0,000 
       Other 
      Abnormal Return vs 
Market 1047 0,610 -0,103 *** 0,000 -0,194 *** 0,000 
Fama-French 3-Factor 
alpha 1047 0,620 -0,106 *** 0,000 -0,176 *** 0,000 
       
Other vs PE/VC 1057 0,692 -0,027** 0,023 -0,152* 0,065WMW 
 
